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Abstract: The emergence of ISIL or ISIS, the Sunni militia, 
has shocked the Muslim World, including Indonesia. ISIS is 
the ultra jihadist for global terrorism. ISIS is also a 
translation from the Arabic, Ad-Daulah Islamiyah fi al-Iraq wa 
Ash-Sham. Some call it as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), which specifically has a different coverage area. The 
term includes the Sham or the Levant region between the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Euphrates River that the country 
coverage includes Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel. 
The term Syria confined to the state of modern Syria that is 
currently in conflict. In this case, the involvement of 
hundreds Indonesians in the ISIS in the Middle East region 
is not new because previously, there is a precedent that some 
Indonesian citizens in the past had involvement in conflicts 
abroad when US President Jimmy Carter used the CIA to 
weaken the power of the Soviets in Afghanistan. In 
responding the ISIS networkers and followers in Indonesia, 
the Jakarta government and Muslim organizations like 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) dan Muhammadiyah have launched 
action and campaign for pluralism, peace, non-violence and 
civil Islam. The campaign by NU and Muhammadiyah for an 
open-minded and pluralistic Islam also comes in a time 
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when Islam is at war with itself over central theological 
questions about how the faith defined in the modern era. 
 
Keywords: ISIS, Daulah Islamiyah, Muslims, Caliphate, 
Indonesia, Middle East. 
 
A striking phenomenon of hundreds of Indonesians, 
who were actively involved in the political dynamics of the 
Islamic world andjoined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), which declared itself as an Islamic Caliphate in June 
28, 2014, shocks the public and government of Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in Indonesia. Since early 2013, 
ISIS has successfully consolidated various radical groups in 
conflict with one another to divert the target: to control the 
region of eastern Syria and western Iraq which cannot be 
maintained effectively by the government of Damascus and 
Baghdad.  
The fall of Mosulwith population of about 2 million 
people into the hands of ISIS, has been so severely bowed to 
Baghdad. Thousands of resident—especially the minorities 
and Shi’ite communities—out of Mosul, the provincial 
capital of Nineveh, look for survival.  
ISIS army takes-over government buildings, oil wells, 
military bases, arsenals, and banks. ISIS, which claims to be 
the onlyDaulah Islamiyah fil Iraq war ash-Sham, has three main 
principles of the struggle, among others: First, establish 
monotheism; second, destroy polytheism and idolatrousness; 
and, third, enforce the law of God by force of arms. With 
these three principles, ISIS joins forces to exploit sentiments 
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of Sunni versus Shi'ite sectarianism and caliphate as a 
political entity unifying Muslims worldwide. They also called 
on the Muslim world, including Indonesia, to support and 
join it. With the three principles of struggle above, ISIS 
destroyed many mosques and holy places that are considered 
as a place of worship that could lead to polytheism and 
contrary to the creed of monotheism. 
In this case, the involvement of some Indonesians in 
the ISIS in the Middle East region is not new because 
previously, there is precedent that some Indonesian citizens 
in the past had involvement in conflicts abroad when 
President Jimmy Carter used the CIA to weaken the power 
of the Soviets in Afghanistan, with fighters from all over the 
world mobilized, including not less 350 people from 
Indonesia, and Osama bin Laden himself from Saudi Arabia 
to destroy the Russian communists.1 
Indeed, we have had precedent on Indonesian 
involvement in armed actions since 1985, in which it can be 
found early in the war of Afghanistan and the conflict in 
Pakistan. In the past, a number of Indonesian citizens were 
also reported military training in Libya. Back to the country, 
among them become the actors of violence and terror that 
has been rife since the early 2000s.  
Although ISIS has a variety of social networks in 
Indonesia, it failed to recruit Indonesian Muslims in large 
																																								 																				
1 John Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and 
International Terrorism, London: Pluto Press, 2002. 
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numbers to support their actions and goals. ISIS failed to 
persuade these groups to encourage intolerance and 
radicalization that can quickly be terrorism in the country. 
Our deeper question is: Is this because ISIS supports 
the sentiments which tend to be universal ummah or 
domestic situation in Indonesia that is still conducive to the 
flowering of radical Muslim, understood as a form of state 
failure and civil society that provide an alternative discourse 
to the narrative of their violence? Or, are local and 
international factors equally dominant?2 
 
Genealogy of ISIS  
The fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq's Shi’ite regime 
spawned to not give place to the Sunnis. The failure of Iraqi 
leaders, including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in building 
an inclusive political system, has given ways to grow 
militants across Iraq, including the Sunnis, in turn, gave birth 
to ISIS. Sunni militants protested the economic and political 
marginalization by the ruling Shi’ite. Supports given by the 
United States, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to the hardline 
oppositions in Syria also contributed to the birth of ISIS.3 
																																								 																				
2 Noor Huda Ismail, ‘’NIIS Indonesia dan Evolusi Teror 
Mondial,’’ Kompas daily, 7 August 2014. See also, Olivier Roy, 
Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004. 
3Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices, New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2014, p. 6. 
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Of course, the presence of ISIS, which originated 
from the Sunni, has shocked the Muslim World, including 
Indonesia. Some call it as the Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL).4 There is also a call Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS), which specifically has a different coveragearea. 
The term includes the Sham or the Levant region between 
the Mediterranean Sea and the Euphrates River means that 
the country coverage includes Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, 
and Israel. The term Syria is confined to the state of modern 
Syria that is currently in conflict. 
The genealogy of this radical religious organization can 
be traced to the Salafi Jihadist movement who has been 
fighting in Iraq and Syria that are on a mission to the 
formation of Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State). ISIS (Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria), according to Zana Khasraw 
Gulmohamad of the University of Sheffield, stems from the 
birth of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2003 The initial 
declaration of the Daulah Islamiyah organization that 
conducted the insurgents in Iraq group is established by az-
Zarqawi in 2004 who eventually reveals himself as part of al 
Qaeda. 
After Az-Zarqawi was killed in battle against the army 
of the United States in mid-2006, AQI was established by 
Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi from Jordan, who in 2006 was 
murdered by the United States. He was replaced by Abu 
Ayyoub al-Masri, Egyptian origin, who supports the 
																																								 																				
4Elmihwar, newspaper, Egypt (6/8/2014). 
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formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) or Daulah 
Islamiyah fil Iraq. 
Helm of Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq switched to Abu 
Hamza al-Mohajir until April 19, 2010. He was killed in an 
attack by American troops. The leadership then fallen into 
the hand of Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi for about a year. Then, 
that helm was transferred to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. After 
standing ISI, Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi known as Abu Hameed 
Dawood Mohammed II or Khalil al-Zawri (Awwad Ibrahim 
Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai and Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qureshi 
al-Baghdadi) makes Baquba as his headquarters. Al-
Baghdadi, the Iraqi people, replaced al-Masri, killed by 
American troops and Iraqis. 
Under the control of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Daulah 
Islamiyah fil Iraqorganization increasingly expanded its 
influence until April 9, 2013 when appearing a voice 
recording associated with the voice of Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi. The tape was stated, Jabhah Nushra (Victory 
Front) in Syria is a continuation Daulah Islamiyah of 
Iraqorganization. The tape also described that the name 
Jabhah Nushrah and Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq be removed, 
and later proclaimed Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq wa ash-Sham, 
that is written by media as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) by 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as his successor, while Raqqa city 
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located in Syria, which borders with Turkey, as its capital.5 
In 2012, al-Baghdadi sent his men to form a branch of 
al Qaeda Syria, named Jabhah al-Nusra. The group aims to 
get rid of President Bashar al-Assad and establish a Sunni 
Islamic state led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, a Salafist-
oriented leader. According to the Australian National 
Security, they received funding and support from AQI and 
ISI. However, they subject to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader 
of Al Qaeda. 
Al-Baghdadi who wants to be a single leader, in 8 
April 2003 through a decree stating that AQI and Jabhah al-
Nusra turned into ISIS/ISIL. However, Jabhah al-Nusra 
rejected it. Dispute between the ISIS and Jabhah al-Nusra 
prolonged and failed to be mediated by Ayman al-Zawahiri 
that ultimately claimed that Al-Qaeda cut off ties with ISIS 
because ISIS has its own conception and position not 
subject to the Al Qaeda and Ayman Center.6 
According to German radio, Deutsche Welle (DW), 
ISIS takes money at the Central Bank of Mosul, some 500 
billion Iraqi dinars, or about 429 million dollars plus a 
certain amount of gold. "With that much money, they used 
to pay 60,000 fighters," said Eliot Higgins, a resident scholar 
of the UK. Currently, ISIS has estimated about 10,000-
																																								 																				
5 “Ketua Tanfidziyah PW NU Jawa TimurM. Hasan 
Mutawakkil Alallah: ISIS dan Perlunya Pergub”, Jawa Pos, 9 Agustus 
2014. 
6Trias Kuncahyono, ‘’Radikalisme: Genesis ISIS”, Kompas, 
August 2, 2014. 
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armed members from different parts of the world: Europe, 
Africa, the Middle East, Australia, and Southeast Asia, 
including Indonesia. 
According to the Director of the Center for Research 
on the Arab World at the University of Mainz, Germany, 
Gunter Meyer, "The most important financial source of ISIS 
is the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and 
United Arab Emirates," especially from the rich people in 
the country. 
The motivation of initial assistance they provide, 
according to Meyer, is to support the ISIS to face the regime 
of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. This support is 
encouraged "hatred" sectarian: three-quarters of the Syrian 
population is Sunni Muslim, but most of the ruling elite are 
the Alawite minority, which is often called the part of the 
Shia Muslims. 
BBC stated that ISIS received financial support from 
donors in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan. It 
happened when they were still called Al Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI). However, after the breakup of AQI with its central 
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, and proclaimed ISIS, according 
to CNN and The New York Times, they rely on the 
financial resources of criminal acts, such as kidnapping, 
extortion, and robbery. 
Syrian conflict is initially localized, such as 
demonstrations to topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad, 
then evolved into an international conflict, involving 
thousands of combatants from dozens of countries: Saudi 
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Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Chechnya, Turkey, America, England, 
France, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 
Majority of Afghan alumni in Indonesia are tawaquf 
(silent) or be very careful in giving support to the ISIS 
openly because of their loyalty to al Qaeda today led by 
Ayman al-Zawahiri. In 2013, al-Zawahiri issued a fatwa that 
ISIS is not part of Al Qaeda because ISIS has acted very 
brutally; thus, it damaged not only the image of Al Qaeda in 
Syria but also the Islam as strategic religion. Al Qaeda has 
had its own army, Jabhah al-Nusra, which has been first to 
come and help the people of Syria long before the ISIS did.7 
Breaking up the partnership between the ISIS and 
Jabhah al-Nusra is also carried over to Indonesia. In fact, in 
some areas, including in the prison that housed inmate 
terrorists, occur fierce hostility between ISIS supporters and 
Jabhah al-Nusra. 
In Indonesia, said Noorhuda Ismail, one of the local 
factors that cause people interested in joining the ISIS and 
even willing to die for this choice is the weak system of law 
enforcement, especially in prison. Massive Distribution of 
ISIS message in Arabic translated by Aman Abdurrahman, 
terrorism inmates, is done from inside the prison in 
reclaiming. Its visitors then disseminate this translation via 
the internet. 
																																								 																				
7 Noor Huda Ismail, ‘’NIIS Indonesia dan Evolusi Teror 
Mondial,’’ Kompas, 7 Agustus 2014. Noor Huda is a founder 
ofYayasan Prasasti Perdamaian; he is currently a PhD student in 
Politics and International Relations, Monash University, Australia. 
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Aman Abdurrahman has the record of 
accomplishment as terrorist that jailed twice since 2004. He 
was involved in Cimanggis bombing and military training in 
Aceh in 2010. He refused to cooperate with prison officials, 
as well as consistent with the takfiri ideology (infidelizing 
people outside the group), and he turns out to be the main 
attraction among Islamic activists who thirst the figure of 
the leadership. 
Although there is no evidence that there is an official 
order from Aman Abdurrahman for his protégés to flee to 
Syria and join the ISIS, but through translation, writings, and 
sermons, it is then recycled by his followers and the media, 
through open discussion, marches, demonstrations, and 
social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTubegiving 
‘jihad’ imagination beyond the nation-state concept for the 
readers, and then moves them to act. 
What is interesting is the majority of the Afghan 
alumni in Indonesia has responded tawaquf (silent, quiet) or 
be very careful in giving support to the ISIS openly because 
their loyalty to al Qaeda, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, is 
stronger. 
 
Responses of Indonesia 
Although the concept is not clearly relevant, the issue 
of ISIS caliphate makes various parties in Indonesia wary of 
the spread of the ISIS teachings and recruitment. Although 
the potential for success is relatively small, the idea and 
praxis of ISIS can cause serious problems in politic, religion, 
Isis, Indonesian Muslims and Global Terrorism: A Reflection	
JICSA   Volume 06 - Number 01, June  2017 69 
and society in the country. Almost certainly, the main 
supporter of the caliphate of his ISIS is a radical person or a 
small group of radicalists who have been active in 
Indonesia.Responses from state and society in Indonesia to 
the ISIS existence in Middle East are varied. In this regard, 
there are some important things to get attention. 
First of all, The Indonesian government, through 
Minister of Coordinating for Politics, Law and Security 
Djoko Sujanto, has submitted that ISIS is a dangerous 
movement to look out for, it is against Pancasila (state 
ideology), and not allowed to flourish in Indonesia. Even, 
the government also stated ISIS as a terrorist organization. 
Secondly, religious leaders, Nahdlatul Ulama (a 
traditional Islamic Scholar organization), Muhammadiyah, 
and the MUI (Indonesia Ulama Council) also stated that 
ISIS cannot be claimed as an Islamic movement, especially 
Sunni, but no more than a political organization, that 
justifies violence. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah increase efforts to socialize the Islamic 
concept rahmatan lil'alamin and commitment to the 
Indonesian nation-state as the final form of the struggle of 
the Indonesian Muslims with Pancasila as the state 
determination, based on NU Ulama National Conference in 
Situbondo (1983). 
There are also a number of people who propose the 
revocation of nationality if there are citizens who sweared 
loyally to ISIS. This fierce response may be because 
Indonesia has a long experience with the issue of religious 
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violence and terrorism. In anticipation of the potential 
development of ISIS in Indonesia, however, some Ulama 
said, the emergence of the allegiance of loyalty to ISIS which 
spread in different places must be addressed with calm, not 
nervous, and redundant. They said that the proposed 
revocation of nationals (citizenship) mightbe considered as a 
form of excessive nervousness. Community groups in 
Indonesia, giving support to ISIS, are small. Movement cells 
can also be quickly uncovered. 
Thirdly, its vertices do not vary much with the radical 
movements that have already been known. Some of the 
groups known, as radicalists even do not all agree with ISIS. 
Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Salvation Front), for example, 
disagreed with ISIS. Although Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as the 
head of JamaahAnsharut Tauhid (JAT) searedhis allegiance 
to ISIS, but in reverse not all components of JAT agree with 
him including his own sons. Ngruki boarding school led by 
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir also stated not supporting ISIS. 
Fourthly, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) also 
disagreed with ISIS although both have ideological similarity 
about caliphate. It shows, in terms of support, that ISIS does 
not need to be too scared. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) 
actually has the same understanding. They are both idealized 
caliphate state but have a different way in struggling it. If 
ISIS as done in Iraq and Syria struggled with brutal violence 
and indiscriminant war, HTI chooses the path of peace. 
However, both are anti-Pancasila and still aspiring Islam as a 
healing antidote. If there is a political opportunity, it is not 
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impossible HTI and ISIS will work together. Even the burst 
of a number of Indonesian citizens reportedly joined the 
ISIS in Syria; many Islamic organizations refuse to support 
the ISIS. 
Allegiances to Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of ISIS 
will only be a momentary phenomenon that will disappear 
by itself. However, it can be ascertained, supporting 
footman’s ISIS is the degree of radicalism that had reached 
to an end, including denying the Pancasila. Thus, ISIS issues 
are not excessive but still important for Indonesian to give 
high vigilance. 
Fifthly, in the context of radical movements in 
Indonesia, ISIS only generates momentum for the 
consolidation of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia. 
This movement will be enlarged in Indonesia in the event of 
national political instability. As in his native country, ISIS 
grows and develops because there is political instability in 
Iraq and Syria. It tells how the importances of Indonesia to 
still maintain its political stability to ensure the country able 
to standing strongly to face all kinds of threats. 
Additionally, supporters of ISIS in Indonesia certainly 
are people who think Indonesia is infidel state, in which 
democracy and nationalism, according to them, are a pagan 
system. 
Sixthly, In East Java and many vulnerable provinces, 
in which they are potential areas for the growth of terrorism 
and supporting to the existing ISIS, there is an initiative of 
the governors which publishes 'governor rule' 
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(gubernatorial) in anticipation of the radical religious 
movements. In East Java, for instance, there is an experience 
for the birth of gubernatorial Number 55 Year 2012 on 
fostering the Guidance and Control for the Deviant of 
Religious activity and Misguided, which could become an 
interesting lesson because many benefits have been clearly 
perceived by the people of East Java. With the release of the 
regulation, as idealized together, the security forces have 
legitimacy to stem and anticipate any movements to develop 
ISIS and/or disturb the public. Many radical Muslim 
activists use websites and social media to spread out their 
information and influence to support ISIS. 
In this case, on the recommendation of the National 
Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), the Ministry of 
Communication in 2015 blocked 19 websites it claimed to be 
spreading violent messages and recruiting Indonesians to 
join ISIS. Then the move was reversed, however, after a 
major public outcry, including from civil society groups 
often attacked by these very websites.  
For the radical Muslims, this type of unthinking 
reaction and flip-flopping exposes a hasty and imprudent 
decision-making process that could undermine authority in 
the future, meanwhile the initial move to ban the websites 
sent the wrong message to civil society and mass media that 
saw it as a precedent of a repressive measure that could 
threaten freedom of speech.  
Instead of arbitrarily blocking websites used as 
platforms to spread hateful religious sentiment, the 
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government has to monitor them tightly to gather evidence 
to prosecute them for the content that really violates the 
ITE Law, the way it prosecuted other ITE cases. This is 
important as it sends a message that it does not tolerate the 
spread of terrorist ideology in Indonesia, while not being 
seen as indiscriminately targeting websites with merely 
hardline perspectives.8 
The authorities and the security forces awarethat the 
Internet has been used by ISIS and other radical movements 
effectively to spread their ideology and lure new recruits a 
and they know too, Pew Research Survey found that an 
astounding 72% of Indonesian Muslims would prefer to live 
under Sharia law, meanwhile The State Department details 
other Indonesian extremist groups in their most recent 
country report on terrorism from 2013. 40 separate raids led 
to the arrests of more than 75 suspects. One of the biggest 
incidents saw a planned attack on the Embassy of Burma in 
Jakarta thwarted. Many of the terrorist attacks were targeted 
at police. 
 
Hundreds Indonesians Joined ISIS 
On July 2015, a video showing Indonesian pro-Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters, over 70 Indonesian- 
																																								 																				
8Devi Asmarani, ‘’Indonesia struggles to keep citizens from 
joining ISIS’’, retrieved from http 
://www.themalaymailonline.com/opinion/devi-
asmarani/article/indonesia-struggles-to-keep-citizens-from-joining-
isis#sthash.3j0sOUJd.dpuf 
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speaking men in military fatigues and armed with rifles are 
preparing for a field assignment. These men seem in good 
spirits as they smile and joke for the videographer, referring 
to themselves as the Ikhwan Nusantara, or the brothers of 
the archipelago - a reference to Indonesia as the world's 
largest archipelagic nation.  
The videographer also introduced some of the men as 
he walked around, giving their names as Abu Salma, Abu 
Wurwah, Aman Abdurrahman. The video is strategic 
propaganda. It shows the Indonesians having a place, a force 
there. This would invite other pro-ISIS people in Indonesia 
to join.  
The clip is the latest to show the existence of the 
Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyah, or Malay 
Archipelago unit for ISIS, and analysts say it is proof there is 
a significant number of members who have joined as 
fighters. The emergence of the new clip comes as officials in 
Indonesia are getting tough on ISIS supporters, readying 
charges against as many as 14 men accused of either creating 
a website to promote ISIS, or funding and helping ISIS 
supporters to travel to the Middle East to link up with the 
militant group Syria and the number has increased each 
month. Many of those who have slipped into Syria 
pretended to be tourists or students. Aman Abdurrahman is 
one of the radical Muslim figures who help the ISIS to get 
supports from the young Muslims in Indonesia. 
In this case, Aman Abdurrahman had use his influence 
to Sam, a Ring Banten terror network member who served a 
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nine-year sentence for robbing a goldsmith to finance the 
first Bali bombing, visited his friend Rois Abu Syaukat in 
Kembang Kuning prison within the Nusakambangan prison 
complex. Aman Abdurrahman is a key figure in the 
Indonesia-Syria pipeline and he is the takfirist ideologue, 
who began translating ISIS tracts following its formal split 
from the Nusra Front in April 2013. He has been one of the 
most vocal advocates of ISIS from his cell at 
Nusakambangan prison. Aman Abdurrahman is Rois’s 
cellmate. Shortly after the visit, Sam left for Syria.9 
Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail noted 
that Sam professed in January 2012 that he did not intend to 
participate in any future “actions” in Indonesia. However, he 
would do what he could to “help oppressed Muslims 
anywhere.” In addition, when Taufik Andrie, the director of 
the Institute for International Peace Building, met with Sam 
in late 2012, he found that Sam was distressed that no one 
was mobilizing either relief aid or jihad on behalf of the 
Rohingya minority in Burma. There was no mention of 
Syria. After meeting with Rois and Aman at Kembang 
Kuning in 2013, he decided to join the fight in Syria. Given 
that Aman is a key ISIS supporter, it is likely that he 
prevailed upon Sam to join ISIS. On arrival in Syria, Sam 
“remained in ready contact via Facebook and shared 
																																								 																				
9Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, ‘’There and 
Back Again: Indonesian Fighters in Syria’’, The Middle East Journal, 
January 27, 2015, http://www.mei.edu/ content/map/there-and-back-
again-indonesian-fighters-syria. 
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information on developments in Syria,” especially as they 
pertained to ISIS. Sam became a cheerleader for ISIS with 
Facebook postings on Syria’s “5-star jihad.” Then he was 
killed in Ramadi in April 2014.10 
The authorities in Indonesia see all of them as one 
group who has divided tasks among themselves. They are in 
one group with a wanted terrorist, Abu Jandal, who 
threatened to attack the government, especially the prisons 
that house terrorists in Indonesia.11 
We noted that of the more than 500 Indonesians that 
are believed to have joined ISIS, about half have gone on to 
fight in Syria or Iraq. Contrast this with the fact less than 
200 Indonesians was estimated to have fought in 
Afghanistan for al-Qaeda, and since 1999, the police has 
arrested more than 450 terror suspects. Some of them were 
released after serving their sentences. These people, he said, 
																																								 																				
10 Hwang and Ismail explain that, still others are leaving 
directly from Indonesia, using channels similar to those 
operationalized during the Soviet-Afghan war. Indonesians are 
traveling to Malaysia and from there departing for Syria. Much like 
the Afghan veterans who identified themselves as Filipinos on forged 
passports to head to the Afghan front, Indonesians are identifying 
themselves as Malaysians. Interestingly, Malaysians are also departing 
from Indonesia to avoid attracting the attention of their own security 
services. Moreover, there is now a sufficient enough number of 
Malaysian and Indonesian fighters on the ground in Syria that, as of 
July 2014, there was discussion of forming a Katibah Nusantara, or a 
special Malay-speaking unit, of ISIS.  
11The Straits Times, July 17, 2015. 
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could easily go back to their old activities unless they shifted 
paradigm. 
In this case, radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir -- viewed 
as the spiritual leader of the al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah 
Islamiyah -- is currently in an Indonesian prison in Java, but 
has declared support for ISIS. Ba'asyir has pledged allegiance 
to ISIS from his jail cell and is encouraging radicals to join 
the group. Actually, like other radicals, Indonesian extremists 
have even brought their families to Syria and Iraq so they 
could live under full Islamic law, and reported, they receive 
stipends for housing, food, and education and radical 
schools. 
Our field research found that the number of Islamic 
State (ISIS) recruits from Indonesia tripled to over 500 by 
the end of last year. Home to the world's largest Muslim 
population, Indonesia's more than 200 million Muslims 
make up 13% of the world's total Muslims. The nation's 
history of extremist movements makes it a ripe location for 
ISIS recruits. 
Wildan Mukholland, for instance, was one of those 
recruits. He came from the same village in Indonesia as two 
militants convicted and executed for their role in the 2002 
Bali terrorist bombings, which killed over 200 people and 
were carried out by Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda affiliate.12 
																																								 																				
12About Wildan Mukholland, see, “ISIS in Indonesia: 500 
Recruits and Counting”, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6002/isis-
indonesia. See, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/jakarta-
grapples-with-indonesian-pro-isis-fighters 
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Mukholland grew up admiring the two terrorists and 
eventually went on to join ISIS and move to the Middle 
East. Last year, he blew himself up in a terrorist attack in a 
restaurant in Baghdad. In that similar case, Afief Abdul 
Madjid, 63, had travelled to Syria to allegedly attend military 
training. He was accused of spreading violent ideology when 
he returned home. 
He was sentenced by the court on other charges, 
receiving four years' jail for funding a terrorist paramilitary 
training camp in Aceh in 2010, less than the eight years 
demanded by prosecutors. 
The prosecutor handling the Afief case focused on 
events that occurred in Syria, which were more challenging 
to prove, meanwhile one of the men, Muhammad Amin 
Mude, 41, was arrested after police said they foiled his 
attempt to arrange for six people with fake passports to go 
to Syria. Amin is alleged to have arranged the trips of three 
batches of travelers to Syria prior to his arrest. Another of 
those arrested, Muhammad Fachry (M. Fachry), is accused 
of setting up and running a radical website that promotes 
ISIS and invites people to go to Syria. 
ISIS is not the only terrorist group looking for a base 
in Indonesia. Hamas also tried to open an office there to 
help manage its fundraising operations in the region, but was 
denied by Jakarta government.  
Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim-majority country 
with 250 million people, practices a tolerant brand of Islam 
and has long eradicated terrorist networks such as the Al-
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Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah, but it is now grappling with 
a small radical fringe that includes pro-ISIS sympathizers.  
Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail said that, 
of the approximately 8,000 foreign fighters from 74 
countries believed to have joined the Syrian conflict, it is 
unclear how many of them are Indonesian. Official 
government estimates vary from a low of 24, cited by 
General Ansyaad Mbai, the director of the National Anti-
Terrorism Agency, to a high of 56, as stated by General 
Sutarman, the National Police commander. One Jemaah 
Islamiyah member stated that by his own count, some 150 
fighters were in Syria with either ISIS or the Nusra Front.13 
Aspiring jihadist are traveling to Syria by way of four main 
channels. Some join with Jemaah Islamiyah as part of its 
humanitarian arm, Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI), 
for a month-long tour providing relief and medical 
assistance. While on the tour, these individuals slip away. 
Most have joined the Nusra Front. However, when ISIS 
split from the Front, a portion of those fighters left for ISIS. 
Others have made it to Syria after performing the ‘umrah, 
the little hajj, taking a boat from Yemen through the Suez 
Canal to Latakia in Syria.14 
																																								 																				
13Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, ‘’There and 
Back Again: Indonesian Fighters in Syria’’, The Middle East Journal, 
January 27, 2015. Retrieved from 
http://www.mei.edu/content/map/there-and-back-again-indonesian-
fighters-syria. 
14Australian media estimates put the number of Indonesian 
fighters on the ground in Syria at closer to 300. Security analysts 
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For the Indonesian jihadist in Syria, their experiences 
as volunteer fighters would enrich their struggle as the real 
Muslims in the arena of global conflict in which they can 
meet, communicate and exchange of ideas each other with 
the volunteer Jihadist from European Union, Africa, the US 
and so forth. These historical experiences have been their 
pride as the global Muslim Jihadist in the context of the 
struggle for the real in the battle for God, to borrow 
‘KarenArmstrong’s political metaphor’. 
According to Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda 
Ismail, amongothers, most notably alumni of the Al 
Mukmim Islamic boarding school in Ngruki near Solo, have 
used Facebook to connect with fellow alums studying in the 
Middle East. Nine alumni of Al Mukmim, also known as 
Ngruki, have been documented as having joined the fight, 
leaving from boarding schools in Yemen and Pakistan, 
where they had been doing follow-up study.15 Several were 
attending Al Iman, a boarding school in Sana, Yemen. Al 
Iman has been especially vocal in its support for Sunni 
fighters in Syria and thus provided the necessary conduits to 
travel there. These fighters connected other Al Mukmim 
alumni to contacts in Syrian militant groups. By way of the 
																																								 																																							 																																							
believe that official government estimates are understating the number 
of Indonesian fighters, while Australian estimates are overstating the 
number. 
15Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict,” Institute for the Policy 
Analysis of Conflict, IPAC Report 6, January 30, 2014, retrieved from 
http: //file.understandingconflict.org 
/file/2014/01/IPAC_Indonesians_the_Syrian_Conflict.pdf 
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connection and networking the militant groups, there open 
the door to go Syria/Iraq. 
Based on our interview with one of the returnees from 
Syria, the Indonesian jihadist are very confident that by 
joining ISIS in Syria or Iraq, they will get blessing by Allah 
and, even, they will be paid with high salary more than 
enough compared with their monthly salary in Indonesia as 
the cheap laborers as far as they get here. At least, they will 
get what the so-called ‘’ a shortcut to heaven’’ as the jihadist 
if they killed or die in the battleground. 
As far as we know, the Indonesian Jihadist go to Syria 
through Turkey because Indonesian citizens are eligible for a 
visa-on-arrival in the country, meanwhile the other country 
like Iraq or Jordan is more strict and difficult to give a visa. 
Hwang and Ismail found that, there are two major 
routes that Indonesians tend to take when traveling to Syria 
to join ISIS or Jabhah al-Nusra. Most typically, they cross 
through Turkey since Indonesian citizens are eligible for a 
visa-on-arrival. One common route is to fly from Jakarta to 
Istanbul and then travel over land to Reyhanli, a town near 
Turkey’s border with Syria. From there, arrangements are 
made to cross the Syrian border. Others have taken a more 
indirect route, traveling from Indonesia to Malaysia and then 
departing from Kuala Lumpur, often with Malaysian identity 
papers, to Doha, Qatar. They then travel to Istanbul and 
finally go by land to Reyhanli. In December 2014, Malaysian 
authorities caught some two dozen Indonesians attempting 
to go to Syria via this latter route. In the press/media, this 
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story spread out among the radical Muslims in Indonesia 
who are interested to join ISIS, and this stimulate them to 
make the contacts with their networking and radicals cell in 
the spirit of jihadist for ISIS.  
In this case, as many as 16 Indonesian citizens are 
reported to have gone missing in Turkey while they were 
vacationing. The 16 missing individuals left Indonesia using 
a travel agency and their whereabouts remain unknown. 
They are suspected to have fled outside of Turkey to join the 
notoriously known radical group, Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS). A number of rumors led to the speculation that 
these individuals have deliberately gone missing as they 
travelled across the border to join the notoriously known 
radical group ISIS. Reports said, it is a very likely possibility 
knowing that Turkey is located next to Iraq and Syria, the 
two countries where most of the radical group is resides.16 
Many of the Indonesian workers who went to do 
‘umrah’ to Saudi Arabia never came back and so they 
furthered their journey somewhere else, most likely to join 
ISIS. Because if they are not doing anything wrong, why are 
																																								 																				
16In March 2015, The Chairman of Indonesian Intelligence 
Agency (BIN) Marciano Norman revealed that the Indonesian 
government endeavor to gather more information regarding the 16 
missing Indonesians who were last seen in Turkey. BIN thinks that the 
strategy of using a travel agent to travel somewhere first just to transit 
is not a new one but often used, especially by those who went to do 
‘umrah’ and never returned since. The Indonesian Consulate in 
Istanbul, Turkey have released the names of the 16 missing 
Indonesians in Istanbul. Among 16, 10 originating from Surabaya, 
East Java, whereas the other 6 came from Surakarta, Central Java. 
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they hiding or running away from their own government 
who are suppose to protect them. It is possible; there is the 
travelling agency that is suspected to have been helping 16 
people who are now on the run to somewhere unknown. 
Some Muslims in Middle East supposed to finance 
Indonesians wanting to join ISIS to launch what the so-
called the holy jihad, even though theydo not understand the 
real situation in Syria and Iraq.  
Based on Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda 
Ismail’s study, the Indonesian diaspora in the Middle East 
has been critical in assisting Indonesians seeking to fight 
with ISIS and the Nusra Front by providing them with 
logistical support and local contacts. There will be some and 
the concern is that these people will now have combat 
experience, tactical skills, weapons knowledge, deeper 
ideological commitment and international connections. Even 
if it is just a handful of people, they could provide leadership 
for the tiny extremist movement here 
Once the jihadist arrives at the border, someone from 
ISIS or Jabhah al-Nusra picks them up and transports them 
to safe houses on the other side. Total travel costs, including 
the flight to Istanbul, local transport to the border, and two 
days accommodation along the way, are estimated at 
between $1000 and $1500.17 
																																								 																				
17Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, ‘’There and 
Back Again: Indonesian Fighters in Syria’’, The Middle East Journal, 
January 27, 2015, http://www.mei.edu/ content/map/there-and-back-
again-indonesian-fighters-syria. 
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Some Indonesians joining ISIS and the Nusra Front 
hail from radical groups, while others are independent 
operators, radicalized through the Internet. Jemaah 
Islamiyah members typically affiliate with Jabhah al-Nusra. 
Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and Mujahidin Indonesia 
Timor, whose leaders have sworn bai‘at (an oath of 
allegiance) to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, send their members to 
ISIS.  
In this case, Aman Abdurrahman supporters have 
been setting themselves up as ISIS recruiters and organizing 
mass pledge sessions in radical mosques. In connection with 
this action, a few armchair jihadists like Muhammad Fachry 
have latched onto ISIS propaganda to widen their networks 
through social media and through organizing public 
demonstrations of support for the Islamic State. However, 
unlike others, M. Fachry, who leads the Forum Aktifis 
Syariat Islam (FAKSI, Forum of Islamic Law Activists), has, 
and wisely perhaps, played no direct role in sending 
Indonesian fighters to Syria. However, the publicity 
machinery he has created, especially his jihadi website Al 
Mustaqbal, has allowed Aman Abdurrahman to become, as 
Indonesia watcher Sidney Jones puts it, “the most important 
ideological promoter of ISIS” in Indonesia despite being 
physically confined to prison.18 
																																								 																				
18Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, ‘’There and 
Back Again: Indonesian Fighters in Syria’’, The Middle East Journal, 
January 27, 2015, http://www.mei.edu/ content/map/there-and-back-
again-indonesian-fighters-syria. 
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ISIS, Notion of Takfirism and Islamic Extremism 
Analysts and the authorities have warned that a lack of 
concerted efforts in fighting the proliferation of the radical 
ideology propagated by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) has resulted in an unprecedented rise in the number 
of Indonesians leaving for the Middle East to fight for the 
group. In total, an estimated 514 Indonesians have gone to 
Syria and Iraq to fight with the ISIS, around half of whom 
had been living in nearby countries as students or migrant 
workers prior to the rise of the ISIS. Indonesia is probably 
the region's biggest supplier of ISIS fighters. In comparison, 
around 40 Malaysians, 200 Filipinos and 60 Australians have 
joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq, according to several media 
reports. 
One should remember that, because Indonesia has the 
world's largest Muslim population, the country would always 
be at the center of recruitment, although only hundred 
Muslims would join ISIS. Institute for Policy Analysis of 
Conflict (IPAC) director Sidney Jones noted that the 
number of Indonesians who went to fight in Afghanistan 
from 1985 to 1994 did not exceed 300. 
Since the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the 
government has declared ISIS an illegal organization and 
ideology, as they are opposed to Pancasila (Indonesia's 
philosophical foundation). Nevertheless, unlike in Malaysia 
and Singapore where ISIS supporters can be charged and 
detained upon their departure to the combat zone, Indonesia 
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authorities still have no legal basis to do the same. While the 
government has repeatedly emphasized the danger of ISIS 
ideology, maybe only the Indonesia's National 
Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) and the National Police 
have been actively involved in prevention measures. 
Prof. Mohamad Bazzi of New York University 
emphasize that, one of the pillars of ISIS' ideology is that it 
is the true - and only - defender of Sunni Muslims, who are 
being persecuted in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt and 
everywhere else where ISIS has carried out attacks, either 
directly or through its affiliates. In its slick propaganda, ISIS 
emphasizes two major themes: a righteous and idyllic life for 
"true" Muslims in its self-declared Islamic state in parts of 
Syria and Iraq, and an ideology that sanctifies violence as the 
only means for Sunnis to achieve power. The extremist 
group is highly sophisticated in its use of social media to sow 
fear among its enemies, and to entice alienated Muslims 
living in the West to "immigrate" to ISIS-controlled 
territory.19 
ISIS is the global ultra-Revivalists for global terrorism 
and never mind that ISIS selectively uses a group of clerics 
and scholars from across Islam's history who advocated 
declaring other Muslims as infidels or apostates, and justified 
their killing. The majority of the world's 1.6 billion Muslims 
reject this notion of takfirism. However, it is central to the 
																																								 																				
19Mohamad Bazzi, “Trumpeting Islamophobia helps ISIS”, The 
Straits Times, December 12, 2015. 
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ideology of most of today's militant groups, who have killed 
far more Muslims than non-Muslims. That fact becomes 
obscured as long as ISIS has new opportunities to portray 
itself as the defender of Muslims.20 
In Indonesian Muslims perception, genealogy of the 
ISIS emergence, as a political movement, wrapped in clothes 
of Jihad by religious doctrines, in which the Islamic thinkers 
categorized them as the global ultra-Revivalists for global 
terrorism. Their deployment and activities in Indonesia 
would be to watch out from day to day because they danger 
the cohesiveness of its people. Their doctrine and religious 
understanding are certainly very dangerous for the continuity 
of tradition and culture of Indonesian Muslims, especially 
among the nahdliyin (Nahdlatul Ulama or NU) and 
Muhammadiyah moderate Muslims.  
When the ISIS and radical Muslims movement is not 
forbidden, of course, there will be potential course for 
political upheaval that led to the horizontal conflicts among 
communities of Indonesia. As world leaders call for Muslims 
to take the lead in the ideological battle against a growing 
and increasingly violent offshoot of their own religion, 
analysts say NU/Muhammadiyah's campaign is a welcome 
antidote to Islamic extremism. 
The campaign by NU and Muhammadiyah for an 
open-minded, pluralistic Islam also comes at a time when 
Islam is at war with itself over central theological questions 
																																								 																				
20ibid. 
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about how the faith defined in the modern era. In a way, it 
should not be surprising that this message comes from 
Indonesia, the home of Islam Nusantara, widely seen as one 
of the most progressive Islamic movements in the world. 
The movement - its name is Indonesian for East Indies 
Islam - dates back more than 500 years, and promotes a 
spiritual interpretation of Islam that stresses non-violence, 
inclusiveness and acceptance of other religions. Such 
liberalism poses strongly a counter-argument to ISIS. 
Regarding to prevent ISIS so it can not expand the 
reach beyond the digital realm, what the government should 
have been doing since two decades ago is to come up with a 
massive and effective campaign against radical Islamic 
teaching, intensively involving the country’s two largest 
Muslim organizations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, 
as well as the conservative Indonesian Council of Ulama and 
many popular Muslim clerics. 
ISIS ideas and activities can pose a serious problem in 
the political, religious, and social activities in the country. 
Almost certainly, the main supporter of the idea of ISIS 
caliphate state is a radical resident or a small group who has 
been troubling the people of Indonesia. 
 More than that, it is very important to accept 
Pancasila as the state ideology, while Islam remains guarded 
as a creed. We do not need to bang the state basic and 
religion creed. Because, the precept of Pancasila which 
contains the deity is a form of the practice of Islamic law. 
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Caliphate is clearly irrelevant to the Muslims of 
Indonesia. Indonesian Islamic organizations have formed 
the Committee Caliphate following elimination of 
"caliphate" in Turkey in 1924 by the secular Turks; they 
intend to defend and demand that the "caliphate" in Turkey 
revived. 
To respond this phenomenon, in the past, it was "the 
grand old man" Haji Agus Salim, a well-known Muslim 
intelligentsia, who once stated that the committee along with 
Indonesian caliphate is irrelevant. According to him, what is 
called a "caliphate" in Turkey is a despotic and corrupt 
empire that need not be defended, especially by Indonesian 
Muslims. After Caliphate Committee, the issue of caliphate 
was almost entirely absent in the discourse of Indonesian 
Islam, except articulated by Darul Islam movement led by 
SM Kartosuwirjo, a leader of DI (Daulah Islamiyah) who 
initiated Indonesian Islamic State (NII) in 1940’s. 
Kartosuwirjo was sentenced to death under Soekarno 
administration in 1063. 
In addition, Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah almost never talk about 
the caliphate. Instead, they receive and develop concepts and 
praxis Indonesian nation-state. The NU and Muhammadiyah 
realize that the caliphate utopianism lies in the fact that 
Muslims in the region have adopted various nation-states 
based on the reality of a nation with a tradition of distinctive 
society, culture and religion, geographical area, and different 
historical experiences. 
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Therefore, the "unification" in all regions of the 
Muslim world under a single political authority of Islamic 
Caliphate style is clearly and merely empty slogan.21 The vast 
majority of mainstream Muslims in Indonesia is generally 
incorporated in NU, Muhammadiyah and so forth in across 
the country and nation clearly rejected ISIS, which is 
considered as a global terrorist organization by the claim 
"caliphatism" which proved to be full of violence and 
brutality.  
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